ADDRESS

TO THE

Good People of *Great Britain*,

Occasion'd by the

REPORT

FROM THE

Committee of Secrecy.

If the defigning Ministers Measures of Tyranny and Oppression cannot prevent the Roots of Liberty from growing, what Character does he merit, who does not endeavour to promote it?

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LONDON,

Printed [illegible] the Q[illegible]

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26 AUG 1936
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An ADDRESS *to the Good People of* Great Britain, *occasion'd by the Report from the* Committee of Secrecy.

Honest Britons,

THAT you may the better understand how you have been betray'd by the Late Ministry in the Treaties of Peace and Commerce which they made with *France*, it will be necessary to shew the Circumstances that both the Confederates and the Enemy were in, when the *English* Troops separated from the rest of the Allies. The Affairs of *France* were then in a most miserable Condition, their Treasures exhausted, their Credit lost, the Flower of their Troops kill'd; and the rest, by their frequent Defeats, entirely dispirited, encamping in a barren Country, and ready to disband for want of Necessaries; the Allies Masters of all the Rivers, and in a very rich Soil, and with the most numerous and best-appointed Troops they ever brought into the Field, penetrating into the open Country of *France*, so oppress'd then with Famine, that they must have join'd the Allies, to have kept themselves from starving.

Those that were most concern'd in making that *fatal Cessation* of Arms, which lost us all those Advantages, can't forbear owning, that we must have routed the *French* Army: The Duke of *Ormonde*, press'd by the Allies to attack the Enemy without the least Delay, because the Ground where they were encamp'd was as advantageous as could be, and their Situation such, as gave them an Opportunity of falling on their Flank and Rear, says, in his Letter to Mr. *St. John*, *May* 10. 1712. 'You may easily imagine the Difficulty I was under to excuse delaying a Matter, which, according to the Information of the Quarter-masters. *Report*, p. 19.

'masters-General, and several other General Officers, 'seem'd to be so practicable.' And certainly when an Enemy can be attack'd in the Flank and Rear, they can't long stand it, especially if it is by an Army superiour in Number as well as Goodness; and ours (the *French* being oblig'd to fill their Garisons, as not knowing what Town would be besieg'd) exceeded theirs by about 30000.

P. 39. Mr. *St. John* himself not only says, 'I think in my Conscience, that the Order for a Cessation of Arms sent to 'the Duke of *Ormonde*, sav'd their Army from being 'beat;' but supposes that *France* might be ruin'd, if the then Ministry were hang'd. His Words are these: 'We 'stand on the Brink of a Precipice, but the *French* stand 'there too. Pray let Monsieur *Torcy* know, that he may 'get *Robin* and *Harry* hang'd; but Affairs will turn back 'in so much Confusion, that he will wish us alive again. 'We are at the true Crisis of our Disease, we die at once, 'or recover at once. Let *France* depart from that shame-'full Expedient, by which they thought to bubble us, or 'by God both they and we (meaning the Ministry) are 'undone.'

The *French* themselves can't frequently forbear shewing the same Apprehensions. Hence it was that the Committee, speaking of the Cessation of Arms, say, P. 20. 'The Time 'was now come, when the Secretary's Care and Prudence 'was to deliver the *French* King from the Apprehensions, 'under which Monsieur *De Torcy* had so often declar'd 'him to be, for the Events of the Campaign.' And the *French* King himself owns, *that if the Enemy had taken* Letter to the ABp of Paris. Landrecy (which nothing but the Separation of our Troops hinder'd) *they had gain'd an Entrance into his Kingdom.*

Monsieur *Torcy* very zealously pushes on the Cessation, because, says he, they who would break off the Conferences, ground their Hopes on the Event of the Campaign. But nothing, as the Committee observes, can better represent the favourable Opportunity that was lost to the Common Cause, and the Advantage, or rather Deliverance secur'd to the Common Enemy, than the Letter from the Deputies of the States to the Duke of *Ormonde*: so that by Appendix, No. 26. the Confession of all Parties, the *French*, when the Ministry sacrific'd every thing to them, were in a manner at the mercy of the Allies, and consequently ready to accept of a Peace on any Terms.

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If the *French* were then in a much weaker Condition than at the Treaty of *Gertruydenberg*, by the Loſs of ſo many ſtroug Places taken after that time, ought not the Terms of the Peace to have been ſo much more advantageous to the Allies? but they were ſo far from being ſo, that the Lord *Bolingbroke*, in begging the Peace, ſays, 'If P. 39.
'theſe Terms were accepted, let Monſieur *Torcy* ſit down
'and conſider what a Bargain would be made for *France*;
'let him remember his Journy to the *Hague*, and compare
'the Plans of 1709, and 1712. Again, This is Advantage
'enough for *France*, for which they would have given
'more than *Tournay* a Year ago.'

As low as the *French* were, yet they might have been reduc'd much lower; for Lord *Bolingbroke* owns, 'That we P. 35.
'neglected (ſpeaking of the Miniſtry) to put in execution
'ſome Deſigns, which would have annoy'd both *French*
'and *Spaniard*, perhaps more than have been effected in
'the Courſe of this War.'

Theſe things, my Friends, I mention to ſhew, that if the Confederates, without coming to a Ceſſation of Arms, had ſtill puſh'd on their Conqueſt, the *French* King muſt have immediately comply'd with whatever Terms they demanded; and to preſerve *France*, would not only have given up *Spain*, but whatever elſe, here, or in *America*, we ſhould have thought fit to have inſiſted upon.

Mr. *Stanhope*, who knows how to gain Advantages in Treating, as well as Victories in the Field, made ſuch a * Treaty of Commerce with *Charles* III. as excluded the *French* from trading directly or indirectly to the *Spaniſh Weſt-Indies*; and not only lower'd the *Spaniſh* Duties, but got us all the Advantages we could deſire of trading directly to the *Weſt-Indies*; and that our Men of War ſhould have the conveying the *Spaniſh* Fleets, and bringing home the Plate and other Effects belonging to the King. If this Treaty had taken Effect, as it muſt, had we not been betray'd to *France*, what flouriſhing and glorious Circumſtances would the Nation have been in, when the Trade we carry'd on, even amidſt the War, gain'd us (as is demonſtrated by the Letter to a Member of the *October-Club*) three Millions and a Half yearly!

* *Tranſlation of the Treaty of Commerce, made and ſign'd at* Barcelona, *between the Queen and* Charles *III.* July 10. 1707. *Sold by* R. Burleigh *in* Amen-Corner.

And

And here I can't but mention the Introduction to that part of the Article which excludes *France* for ever from
22. this Trade. 'It being evident to all Men, that the Forces 'with which the Crown of *France* has disturb'd *Europe*, 'have been furnish'd and supply'd by the great Treasures 'it draws, and has drawn from the *Spanish* Dominions in 'the *Indies*; and there being likewise no doubt to be 'made, but that the Exclusion of the *French* from that 'Trade is not of less Consequence and Convenience to 'the Crowns that now treat, than that the Subjects of '*Great Britain* and *Spain* shou'd enjoy it: It is therefore 'agreed, *&c.*'

As we shou'd have gain'd thus in our Wealth, so being in the highest Reputation, with our Allies especially, for having so inviolably maintain'd our Faith and Honour, and so punctually observ'd all our Treaties; we should not only have kept the Ballance of Power in our own Hands, but foreign Nations wou'd have paid us, who aim not at Conquest, (our Trade giving us all the Wealth we could desire) a willing Homage, and made us the Arbiters of all their Differences.

But alas, how is this glorious Prospect chang'd, and we become the Reverse of all this! The late Ministry were no sooner settled in their Posts, but they persuaded their Sovereign, most clandestinely, and contrary to her solemn Engagements, to beg a Separate Peace; and upon such base Terms, as none but a conquer'd Nation wou'd have submitted to.

Never was there such a Scene of Folly and Villany, as the Report of the Committee of Secrecy has fully laid open: tho 'tis form'd only out of those Materials which the Persons concern'd in the late Negotiations, thought fit to let them have; who, it can't be presum'd, wou'd have left any thing but what they suppos'd made for their own Justification. And the Committee complain of several Books, Letters, and Papers being missing, and that there's a long Interruption of several material Correspondences.

'The first material Paper, say they, that appears, are 'Propositions from *France*, signed by *Torcy*, *April* 22. 1711. These Propositions, it must be own'd, are sent to the States,
1. with Assurances 'that the Queen was resolv'd in making 'Peace as well as War, to act in perfect Concert with 'them; and that tho there's an Air of Complaisance shown

'but

' to *England*, and the contrary to *Holland*, yet that will ' be of no ill Conſequence as long as the Queen and States ' take care to underſtand each other, and act with as little ' Reſerve as becomes two Powers ſo nearly ally'd in Inte- ' reſt; and this Rule, ſay we, ſhall on our part be invio- ' lably obſerv'd.'

In theſe Propoſitions the *French* King ſays, 'That after ' the Experience he made of the Sentiments of thoſe who ' now govern the Republick of *Holland*, and of their In- ' duſtry to render the Negotiations fruitleſs, he was wil- ' ling to addreſs to the *Engliſh*:' Which ſufficiently clears the *Dutch* from the Calumnies of deſigning to make a Se- parate Peace. And had they entred into any ſeparate Mea- ſures, or given the leaſt Occaſion to the Miniſtry to ſuſpect that they intended to take any ſuch Steps, they, no doubt, wou'd have left an Account of it for their own Juſtification.

Theſe Aſſurances were, no doubt, deſign'd to lull the *Dutch* aſleep, and to make 'em not ſuſpect the treacherous part we deſign'd to play them, in carrying on a ſecret Corre- ſpondence with *France*; which it appears we did in leſs than three Months after: For one of the Private Propo- P. 2. ſitions, dated *July* 1. with which *Prior* was ſent to *France*, was, That the Secret ſhou'd be inviolably kept, till allow'd to be divulg'd by the Conſent of both Parties: and after that, all the Inſtructions the Queen ſent to her Plenipo's were reveal'd to the *French*, and nothing that came from *France*, tho relating to the Intereſt of the Allies, was ever communicated to them.

The main difference between the *French* Miniſters and ours was, that the former wou'd act fairly and above- board, when it did not appear to be contrary to the In- tereſt of *France*; but ours ſo hated every thing that was honeſt, and lov'd tricking ſo well, that rather than act a fair Part, they wou'd not only ſacrifice the Honour and Intereſt of their Country and Queen, but put themſelves in the Power of *France* to uſe them as they pleaſe, even to hang 'em, as *Bolingbroke* owns.

By Monſieur *Torcy*'s Propoſals, *France* offers to treat with *England* and *Holland* either by themſelves, or jointly with the other Allies, not conceiving it poſſible that *Hol- land* ſhou'd be excluded out of the Negotiations: And *Meſnager* (whom *Prior* brought over with him) had In- ſtructions to treat of the Intereſt of the Allies. But

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our Miniſters wou'd conſent to nothing but a Separate Treaty; whereby they not only put the Negotiations upon a better foot than *France* cou'd hope for, but put themſelves in her Power, and brought the Queen to this Dilemma, That ſhe muſt either come into all the Meaſures of the *French*, or give them an Opportunity, by expoſing ſuch a notorious Breach of National Faith, to diſengage all her Allies from her.

And ſo fond were the Miniſters of a Separate Peace, that it was their unanimous Opinion, 'That the *French* 4. 'Anſwer to the Queen's Propoſals ſent by *Prior*, complies 'with every Article of her Majeſty's Demands, except 'that of *North America*, which they ſay, we ſhall be 'able to compound, as your Majeſty ſome time ago re-'ſolv'd to paſs it; provided *France* gave you Satisfaction 'on the ſeventh Article, which ſhe now entirely does.' And yet in this Article the Miniſtry confeſs themſelves impos'd on by *France*, and declare, 'From the firſt Pro-'poſal of Monſieur *Torcy* to that time, they always un-'derſtood, that by the real Securities promis'd in theſe 'Propoſals, were meant *Places*; and they conſent to take 'for real Securities, what they confeſs is none, but what 'a love of Peace induc'd them to accept as an Equiva-'lent.'

What the Miniſtry thought moſt valuable in theſe Ar-ticles, was that part of the Seventh, which grants us an 6. Advantage of 15 *per Cent.* upon our Manufactures ſent to *Spain*; but this great Advantage ſoon vaniſh'd, and was given up by our Miniſtry here: and the Biſhop of *Briſtol* ſays of it, 'That it was granted by the *French* with a 'Deſign, either to inflame things between us and the '*Dutch*, or to give the *French* a Pretence to ſtipulate for 'themſelves ſuch particular Advantages as might be the 'Ruin of ours.'

By theſe Articles, the Queen was not deſign'd to be ac-knowledg'd till the Concluſion of the Peace: not a word of removing the Pretender, no Engagement not to ſup-port him. Nothing relating to Commerce but in general and doubtful Terms, tho the *French* take care to have Li-berty of Fiſhing, and drying of Fiſh in *Newfoundland*, ex-preſly reſerv'd to themſelves. And the Articles relating to *Spain* are in the Name, and by Powers granted by King *Philip*.

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As little advantageous as these Terms are for *England*, yet they are sign'd by *France* as conditional, and not to oblige, but in case of a General Peace: and in this Sense they are accepted by the Ministry; 'who in pressing to 'adjust singly and separately the Interest of *Great Britain*, 'enforce it, by saying, *France* can run no risque in such 'Engagements, since they will have no Effect till a Gene-'ral Peace is sign'd, and that by it they will be enabled 'to make the Conclusion of the General Peace easy to '*France*.' Hard Terms! that such Concessions as these were not to be purchas'd at a less Price, than forcing on our Allies such Conditions of Peace as *France* wou'd be pleas'd to impose on them.

The Ministry, so much in haste were they for concluding this Treaty, had several Conferences with the *French* King's Minister, without any Authority from the Queen. And Mr. *St. John*, by a Letter dated *September* 20. tells the Queen, then at *Windsor*, as a piece of News, 'That the 'Lord Treasurer, Lord Chamberlain, Lord *Dartmouth*, 'and himself, met *Mesnager* at *Prior*'s House; and that 'they then unanimously agreed a Warrant with full Powers 'shou'd be that Night transmitted to her Majesty to sign, 'in order to pass the Seals, to empower them to meet, 'treat, and conclude a conditional Treaty with Mon-'sieur *Mesnager*.' This Warrant is dated the 17th, tho it was not, as appears by *St. John*'s Letter, prepar'd or thought of till the 20th: Nor had they the Courage to use this antedated Warrant, and therefore it was never countersign'd, nor pass'd the Seals; and is endors'd, *not* P. 5. *us'd*. So that from *April* 11. to the 25th of *September*, secret Negotiations were carried on between the Enemy and the Queen's Ministers, without any legal Authority; and consequently, all concern'd in it were within the 25th of *Edw.* 3. But then there's a Warrant sign'd by the Queen at top and bottom, impowering and commanding the two Secretaries, not to treat, but only to sign with Monsieur *Mesnager* the Preliminary Articles, in which it's a fundamental Condition, that they shou'd be conceal'd with the utmost Secrecy.

By this it appears, that the most cautious of the Ministers thought the very signing these Articles highly Criminal; for they, tho they readily concurr'd in privately treating with the *French* Minister, till the separate Negotiations

were brought to Maturity, yet avoided to become Parties when the Treaty was to be ſign'd and executed. And it's remarkable, that through this whole Affair, there's not one Paper counterſign'd by any Miniſter, but the Queen's Name is expos'd to cover all. If Miniſters cou'd ſecure themſelves by ſuch Tricks as theſe, what Conſtitution can be ſafe? And the more excellent the Government, the more ſeverely all ſuch Practices as endanger it ſhou'd be puniſh'd. It's the Duty of Miniſters to make their Proteſts againſt illegal Practices, and if that does not do, to throw up all their Places; otherwiſe, the Preſumption is, if they continue in Favour, that they adviſe theſe things, and wou'd throw all the Odium on their Sovereign. If a Ship in time of War, throwing over-board thoſe Papers that ſhou'd ſhow whence ſhe came, where bound, and to whom conſign'd, be condemn'd as Prize; is not the Preſumption as great, that the Miniſtry is about a criminal Matter, when they dare not openly appear in what they ſecretly adviſe; and not only conceal Books, Letters, and Papers, to hide their Practices, but make the Queen, to ſkreen them, ſign an antedated Warrant, and frequently expoſe her Name both at top and bottom, tho they know our Conſtitution requires, that ſuch things ſhou'd be counterſign'd by the proper Miniſter, in order to have ſome one accountable for what is done?

Upon the ſigning theſe Articles, my Lord *Strafford* is
P. 7. ſent to *Holland* with Inſtructions, dated *October* 1. by which, notwithſtanding this ſecret Treaty, he is to urge the Confederates to hold faſt together; and if the Miniſters of *Holland* ſhou'd expreſs any uneaſineſs at their Apprehenſions of a private Agreement, he is order'd to avoid giving them Satisfaction; and at the ſame time, he is to deliver to the States the Preliminaries ſign'd on the part of *France*, as a Foundation of a General Peace. This Meſſage extremely alarm'd the States, they dreaded the fatal Conſequences of opening the general Conferences upon Articles ſo general and uncertain, that they knew not what they were to truſt to for their Barrier or Commerce.

This made them not only give in Repreſentations to the Earl of *Strafford*, but ſend over Mr. *Buys* to intercede with the Queen to alter her Reſolution, but all in vain; ſhe was inexorable, and declar'd, ſhe wou'd not ſo much as concert a Plan for the Proſecution of the War with the

the States, till they agree to join with her to open the Conferences of Peace. Under these Circumstances the *Dutch* at last agree to open them at the time fix'd by the Queen, *Jan.* 1. 1711.

But this Compliance of the *Dutch* does not hinder Mr. *St. John* from giving Intelligence of all the Queen's Counsels to *France*; particularly, of Lord *Strafford*'s Instructions, tho in them there's a new Scheme for carrying on the War, and the Queen's Resolution thereon.

In the Queen's general Instructions to her Plenipo's, they are order'd to insist, 'That the Security and reasona- P. 9.
'ble Satisfaction which the Allies expect, and which the
'*French* King promis'd, can't be obtain'd, if *Spain* and
'the *West-Indies* be allotted to any Branch of the House
'of *Bourbon*.' Tho by the 6th and 7th Articles of the Preliminaries, *Philip* is own'd as King of *Spain*; nay, from the very beginning of the Negotiations, as appears by the Private Propositions sent to *France* by *Prior*, the Trade of the World, and the entire *Spanish* Monarchy, was design'd to be given up to the House of *Bourbon*. And so cautious were we of offending *France* in this Point, that when all the Allies deliver'd in writing their Answers to the Specifick Explanation that the *French* made of their General Preliminaries, ours were the only Ministers, as appears from their own Letters, that made not any mention of the Restitution of *Spain* and the *Indies*.

Tho we appear'd so zealous for opening the Conferences, yet that was with no other view, but that the Allies might, in appearance, agreeable to the Grand Alliance, have an P. 12.
Opportunity of treating, while the whole Negotiations were carry'd on at *London*, and all was dictated by *France*. Our Ministers, by their publick Instructions, were to act in Concert with the Allies; tho they, according to Mon- P. 9.
sieur *Torcy*'s Request, acted in Concert with the *French* Plenipo's, and upon all Occasions assisted them with their Councils. Lord *Strafford* advises the *French* Plenipo's not to give any Answer in Writing to the Specifick Demands of the Allies, 'Because it wou'd occasion Difficulties and P. 11.
'Delays, which, he says, had better come from them than
'any one else.' And tho he joins with them in pressing the *French* to answer in Writing, that no mark of Disagreement may appear among the Allies; yet he calls the States following this Advice, and refusing to treat upon it, the

the laſt convulſive Pang of an *expiring Faction*. At one time our Plenipo's are order'd to decline the Conferences; and at another, in order to gain time, and to keep the *Dutch* in ſuſpence, they are commanded to revive the Differences between Count *Rechteren* and Monſieur *Meſnager*. In a word, matters were ſo manag'd at *Utrecht*, that it was above a Year before the *Dutch* and *French* met; and all that while the Nation was at as great Expence as if the War had been vigorouſly puſhing on.

The *Dutch* are preſs'd to come into the Queen's Meaſures, without being in the leaſt acquainted with thoſe Meaſures; and this Pretence is carry'd ſo far at laſt, as to be made a handle for the Queen to declare, that ſhe look'd upon her ſelf, from their Conduct, to be under no manner of Obligation to them. This cancelling of Alliances was, as the Committee obſerve, before any thing was finally concluded between us and *France*, or we had the leaſt Security for our Trade, or any other Advantage.

But it was impoſſible for the *Dutch* to come into the Queen's Meaſures, ſince *France* would not vouchſafe to let our Court know upon what Plan ſhe would make Peace with the Allies, tho we frequently begg'd to be let into the Secret, and oblig'd our ſelves not to communicate it to them.

In a Memorial deliver'd to Abbot *Gaultier*, dated *Octob.* 29. 1711. and enforc'd by a Letter from Mr. *St. John*, we deſire ſome Explications of the *French* King's Intentions with reſpect to the Intereſt of the Allies, and ſay, That the *Dutch* have nothing in view but their Barrier and Commerce; and if the Queen can, without fear of being diſown'd, ſpecify ſomewhat near the Barrier *France* will conſent to yield to them, and to aſſure them of their Tariff of 64, there's no room to doubt, that the States would, without any further Heſitation, come into the Negotiations, in the ſame manner as has been concerted. 'Theſe 'Explications, ſays *St. John* to Monſieur *Torcy*, will diſſi-'pate all Clouds, and you may believe we will make uſe of 'it with great reſerve; and if the King would offer ſpeci-'fick Preliminaries, the Queen would never communicate 'them to her Allies. If *Gaultier* returns with theſe Marks of 'Confidence in us, you will ſee our Parliament as much in-'clin'd to Peace as ever it was to War.' Here we ſee our Miniſtry, as the Committee obſerves, begging of *France*, after

after a ſeven Months Treaty, to know only what was deſign'd for our Allies; fearful of being diſavow'd by *France*; promiſing, if they have credit, to uſe it with great reſerve, and never communicate it to thoſe, for whom only they pretend this great Submiſſion is made.

In *April* 1712. the *French* communicate to our Plenipotentiaries a Plan for a General Peace. This is entruſted them under the higheſt Secrecy, and as ſuch tranſmitted here, where no doubt it was firſt concerted; and yet, after this, the *Dutch* were wholly ignorant of the Queen's Meaſures, with relation to them.

The *Dutch*, ſays the Biſhop of *Briſtol*, in his Letter (*June* 1712.) to Lord *Bolingbroke*, ſeem to be uneaſy on no account ſo much, as that they can't come to the knowledg of what is their Lot; their Concern is chiefly that they can't know the Particulars of what is deſign'd for them, eſpecially what Species are to be excepted out of their *Tariff*, or what Towns out of their *Barrier*. This occaſion'd the Biſhop, as with the greateſt Truth he might, to aſſure them he knew nothing of the one or the other: And yet, notwithſtanding this, *June* 24. *St. John* inſtructs the Biſhop, to lay the entire blame of all that has happen'd upon the *Dutch*, and their want of Concert. Tho, to ſhew the unparallel'd Goodneſs of the Queen, he adds, for their ſakes, and the common Intereſt of *Europe*, her Majeſty is ſtill ready to forget all that was paſt, and join with them in the ſtricteſt Terms of Amity and Confidence; when but four days before he had, in the ſtrongeſt Terms, and in the Queen's Name, promis'd Monſieur *Torcy* to conclude a ſeparate Peace with *France*, upon condition *Dunkirk* was deliver'd to the *Engliſh*. After this, when *Bolingbroke* was ſent into *France*, which was about the beginning of *Auguſt*, he was to do his beſt to diſcover, upon the ſeveral Parts of the General Plan of Peace, what the *Ultimatum* of *France* was. P. 30.

And when the Queen, after long entreating, thought ſhe was let into the Secret, and authoriz'd by *France* to tell her Parliament upon what Terms a General Peace might be had, the *French* Plenipo's deny that the Queen's Speech contains their Offers, tho the *Dutch* accept of it as a Plan to treat on. And Lord *Strafford* ſays, 'Nich. *Frog* 'is ready to ſign with us for *Tournay*, which if we ſign 'together, we can't well refuſe him.' And here 'tis to

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be obſerv'd, that Lord *Bolingbroke*, tho he confeſſes that by the Queen's Speech the *Dutch* were to keep *Tournay*, yet he propoſes Expedients for having it reſtor'd to *France*; and this he does in his private Capacity, and with him joins the Lord Treaſurer. Thus it was that thoſe the Queen call'd her good and faithful Allies, whoſe Intereſt ſhe look'd on as inſeparable from her own, were treated by the Miniſtry.

Their Conduct, in endeavouring to get *Sicily* for the Duke of *Savoy*, was as unaccountable; for tho *France* had actually offer'd it to the Emperor, and the Duke himſelf did not reliſh it, declaring (as appears by Lord *Peterborough*'s Letter to Mr. *St. John* of *Sept.* 24. 1712.) 'That 'he was not ſo vainly impatient of the Title of a King, 'as to hazard any thing for it; and that he thought it 'very extraordinary (as every one elſe no doubt muſt) 'that a Prince, beaten for ten years together, ſhould re'main at laſt with the Prize contended for, and which 'ſo often by Parliament had been declar'd the juſt and 'unavoidable Motive of the War:' Yet at laſt, rather than fall out with the Queen and Miniſtry, which on a caſe of Refuſal he was threaten'd with, and being aſſur'd of the Guaranty of *England* and *France*, he was prevail'd on. Upon this the Committee juſtly obſerve, that if the View of the Miniſtry was to diſable the Emperor from ſupporting himſelf againſt *France*, by forcing ſo conſiderable an Ally into the *French* Intereſt, they took the moſt proper Meaſures. The Forwardneſs of the Miniſtry, in offering to make *England* Guarantee for Conditions advantageous only to *France*, and which muſt have engag'd us in a War with the Emperor, ſeems, ſay they, the more extraordinary, ſince, during the Courſe of this Negotiation, they find no Endeavours us'd to procure a Guaranty for the Proteſtant Succeſſion, tho addreſs'd for by both Houſes. Nor was the King of *Sicily*, for whom ſo much was done, ever requeſted to be Guarantee for the ſaid Succeſſion. 'Tis remarkable, that the Queen appears to have
P. 31. the Intereſt of the Duke of *Savoy* more at heart, than that of her own Kingdoms; for ſhe declares, 'tis not poſſible for her to ſign the ſeparate Peace with *France*, till the Duke has full Satisfaction: but there's no ſuch ſtreſs laid upon *France*'s not explaining ſeveral Articles relating to the Intereſt of *Great Britain*, which are own'd to want explaining.

Tho

Tho it was not to be expected that the Queen ſhould declare in the making this Treaty, as ſhe did, in anſwer to an Addreſs from her Parliament in 1707. 'I am fully 'of your Opinion, that no Peace can be honourable or 'ſafe for us or our Allies, till the entire Monarchy of 'Spain be reſtor'd to the Houſe of *Auſtria*:' Yet ſince ſhe had before own'd to her Parliament, 'That nothing 'can be more evident, than that if the *French* King con-'tinue Maſter of the *Spaniſh* Monarchy, the Ballance of 'Power is utterly loſt, and he will be able in a ſhort 'time to engroſs the Wealth of the World:' And had, as Mr. *St. John* ſays in his Letter of *April* 29. 1712. O. S. to Monſieur *Torcy*, often declar'd, 'That 'twill be impoſ-'ſible for her to be content with any Expedient not ve-'ry ſolid, upon an Article ſo important as the Reunion of 'the two Monarchies: This would be to loſe the Fruit of 'all the Blood ſpilt in the Courſe of this War; this 'would be to betray the Common Cauſe, and to expoſe 'both the preſent Age and Poſterity to greater danger 'than 'tis poſſible to imagine:' After all this, who would have imagin'd ſhe could be prevail'd on to be ſatisfy'd with King *Philip*'s verbal Renunciation, which Monſieur *Torcy* honeſtly told our Miniſtry, 'would be null and in-'valid by the fundamental Laws of *France*, which God 'only can aboliſh; and that they would deceive them-'ſelves, who receive it as a ſufficient Expedient to pre-'vent the Miſchief we propoſe to avoid?'

Mr. *St. John*, in anſwer, ſays, 'We are ready to be-'lieve you are perſuaded in *France*, that God alone can 'aboliſh that Law; but you muſt give us leave to be per-'ſuaded in *Great Britain*, that a Prince may depart from 'his Right by a voluntary Ceſſion, and that this Renun-'ciation may be ſupported by the Powers that become 'Guarantees of the Treaty.' Is not this owning that the *French* think, neither *Philip* nor they can be bound by any ſuch Renunciation, but that he is as much their King, and they his Subjects, as if he had made no ſuch Renunciation; and that the reſt of *Europe* have no more Right to hinder him from having both Monarchies, than if he had made no Renunciation, that which he made being null and invalid from the beginning?

Monſieur *Torcy* ſeems by degrees to yield to the great Reaſoning of Mr. *St. John*; and after he had firſt pro-

poſ'd,

pos'd, that King *Philip* ſhould make his Choice hereafter, conſents that he ſhould *now* declare what part he would take when the Crown of *France* falls to him, or he becomes Preſumptive Heir; and that King *Philip* ſhould be a Party in this Treaty; and that all the Powers in *Europe* ſhall enter into an Engagement with *France* to maintain it. Upon this *St. John* argues, 'Altho the King of *Spain* 'ſhould at this Inſtant declare his Choice, what greater 'Security will *Europe* have, if the Execution of it be de-'fer'd to another time? In offering that he ſhould be ob-'lig'd to declare his Choice at preſent, you agree, that 'neither the Stipulations of a Treaty, nor the Guaranty 'of the Powers engag'd in the War, would be ſufficient 'to ſecure that the Choice ſhall be made; how then can 'we conclude that they will be ſufficient to ſecure, when 'the Caſe ſhall happen, he will quit one Crown to accept 'of the other, according to the Choice he ſhall now 'make?' But is not *Philip*'s renouncing at preſent all Claim to *France*, liable to the ſame Objections? For if the time comes, when *France* falls to him, how can we be ſecure he will think himſelf oblig'd by his preſent Renunciation; eſpecially when he, and all *France* believe with him, that the Renunciation is invalid from the beginning? Or how can all the Powers, engag'd in the preſent War, be more capable to hinder him in one Caſe than the other, from accepting both Kingdoms? What can be more unaccountable, than, when it is own'd that the Union of the two Kingdoms will bring inſupportable Miſery on the preſent and future Ages, and that the *French* think a verbal Renunciation ſignifies nothing, that there ſhould be no care taken that the Powers engag'd in the War ſhould be made Guarantees for the Execution of this Renunciation, or that it ſhould be ſolemnly accepted by the States of *France*? This indeed is once ofer'd, and then dropp'd: and tho they were put in mind by the Biſhop of *Briſtol*, to have *Philip* renounce the Regency of *France*, and that the Powers of *Europe* ſhould be Guarantees for it; yet this was never ſo much as propos'd, tho 'tis notorious, that if ever he is in poſſeſſion of the Regency, nothing can hinder him from being King upon the Death of his Nephew.

This Renunciation, and the having it regiſter'd in the Courts of Parliament, where the *French* King before had

regiſter'd

regiſter'd, that *Philip*'s accepting the Crown of *Spain* ſhould be no Prejudice to his Right to the Kingdom of *France*, is what the Miniſtry make the Queen declare from the Throne to be ſuch a Security, that from its own Nature it executes it ſelf, and that by it *France* and *Spain* are more effectually divided than ever.

'Tis no wonder that the *French*, for the ſake of an immediate Ceſſation of Arms, and a ſeparate Peace to follow upon it, which would leave the Allies to their Mercy, ſhould not only agree to this verbal Renunciation, but to the Demolition of *Dunkirk*; when they knew that Loſs could be ſupply'd by a new Canal more beneficial to *France*, and more formidable to the Navigation of *Great Britain*; and that letting in ſome of the *Britiſh* Troops could not be any prejudice, ſince themſelves were permitted to have what number of Ships they pleas'd in the Harbour, and might bring into it any Prizes but *Engliſh*: and 'tis expreſly agreed, that both Land and Sea-Officers ſhould have liberty to ſtay in *Dunkirk*, and exerciſe their ſeveral Offices; which ſuppoſes, that the Soldiers, Marines, and Seamen, on whom theſe Offices were to be exercis'd, might remain there too. And if you add to this, the great number of Inhabitants (thoſe being, according to the Sieur *Tugghe*'s Memorial, 18000 Families) all the Troops we had there were no better than Priſoners; at leaſt there was always Force enough in the Town to let in thoſe that could have made them ſo. P. 20.

After our Miniſtry had prevail'd on *France* to grant them theſe Terms, they concluded, that by the help of their new Ally, they might triumph over their old Allies abroad, and at home over all that had preſum'd to cenſure their Conduct: but they quickly ſaw they were in a worſe Condition than before, that they could neither make War nor Peace; that the Allies, whom they had ſo baſely deſerted, would never enter into any Meaſures with them for carrying on the War; and Peace they could not have, but upon the Terms of *France*, who knew the Nation would not keep up an Army or Fleet to no purpoſe, nor conſent to part with them till a Peace.

The Miniſtry having perſuaded the Queen to aſſure the Parliament, *June* 6. 1712. 'That nothing had mov'd her 'from ſteddily purſuing, in the firſt place, the true In- 'tereſt of her Kingdoms:' And having every where mag-

nify'd the great Advantages gain'd to *Britain* by it, they were loth to have the Falſity of this known, eſpecially ſince *Bolingbroke* on the 24th of *May*, not a Fortnight before the Queen's Speech, propos'd to Monſieur *Torcy*,

P. 37. 'That the Queen being much more intent upon the Gene-
'ral Peace, than any particular Advantages, Commiſſio-
'ners ſhould be appointed to ſettle, after the Peace, ſuch
'Points relating to Trade, as requir'd a longer Diſcuſſion
'than the preſent Criſis would admit.' And nothing then as to our Trade to *Spain* (of the utmoſt Conſequence to the Nation) was ſettled. The coming into theſe Meaſures was the more inexcuſable in Lord *Bolingbroke*, ſince he

Ibid. owns, 'That we might learn, from the Behaviour of the
'*French* at the Treaty of *Reſwick*, that whatever is re-
'fer'd, is given up.'

Ibid. It was agreed, *May* 29. 1712. that *Britain* and *France* ſhould treat one another as *Gentes Amiciſſima*, as friendly as poſſible; and upon this foot the Tariff granted to *Holland*, except the four Species, was to be granted to us. But the *French*, after they had reap'd the full Benefit of the Suſpenſion, thought themſelves at liberty to diſpute the Principle of *Gens Amiciſſima*, and would not grant us this Tariff, until another ſhould be made in *Britain*, which ſhould reduce our Duties as low; and were not content with the Privileges of trading and drying Fiſh on the Coaſt of *Newfoundland*, except they had *Cape Breton* given them, which was always eſteem'd to be a part of *Nova Scotia*, and was ſo declar'd by the Queen in her Inſtructions to the Duke of *Shrewsbury*, and conſequently to belong to her, ſince there was an abſolute Ceſſion of *Nova Scotia* made to her, as ſhe declares in her Speech of *June* 6. and yet they would make no Peace without our parting with both, which was, in effect, parting with the whole Fiſhery.

It was with much ado, and after great Intreaty, that they got from this *Gens Amiciſſima*, the ninth Article of the Treaty of Commerce to be admitted; which Lord *Bo-*

P. 39. *lingbroke* does himſelf the Honour to ſay he drew up, and ſo it ſtands *verbatim* in the Treaty of Commerce, *France* making no Alterations in it. And muſt not theſe Men be very unkward Politicians, who when they had the Terms of Peace in their own Power, brought themſelves, by their Folly and Villany, into ſuch odd perplexing Circumſtances,

ſtances, as not to be able, without vile Submiſſion, to obtain the Favour of ſuch an Article as their own Parliament condemn'd, as abſolutely deſtructive to all the beneficial Trade of *Great Britain?*

How much they had put themſelves in the power of *France*, may be ſeen by *Bolingbroke*'s Letters; in that to the Duke of *Shrewsbury*, he begs of him 'to repreſent to P. 38.
'Monſieur *Torcy*, in the beſt manner he is able, how 'ſmoothly every thing would glide, if the Queen were 'able to ſpeak of her own Intereſt as abſolutely deter-'min'd with *France:* on the other hand, what Travels 'ſhall we be expos'd to, and what Confuſion may ariſe, 'if our Negotiation appears to be ſtill open, and the Se-'cret comes to be divulg'd, that *France* refuſes to make 'good the full Effect of former Promiſes to the Queen?' Then he deſires his Grace to let the *French* Miniſters know what they may expect from the Queen, 'That as they de-'ſire her to precipitate the Concluſion of the Peace, and '*leave all the Confederates at their mercy*, they muſt be 'told, when their mutual Intereſts are ſettled, her Maje-'ſty, who has induc'd the Allies to treat, will, by the 'ſame Meaſures, engage them to conclude, or at leaſt ſhe 'will ſign without them.' He likewiſe complains, 'That P. 37.
'the *French*, by their open Violation of Faith, are re-'moving a Corner-Stone, the removing of which muſt 'prove at laſt as fatal to them as to us.'

Lord *Bolingbroke*, in his Letter to *Prior*, ſays, 'That Ibid.
'the *French* act neither fairly nor wiſely; they preſs us 'to conclude, that they may have others at their mercy, 'and at the ſame time they *chicane* with us concerning the 'moſt eſſential Article of all our Treaty.——I have ex-'hauſted all my Arguments, in the long Letter that, by 'the Queen's Order, I write to the Duke of *Shrewsbury*; 'to you I can only ſay, we ſtand upon the Brink of a Preci-'pice, but the *French* ſtand there too, they may get *Robin* 'and *Harry* hang'd, *&c.*' Then goes on to repeat what I have upon another occaſion taken notice of; and the beſt thing he hopes for himſelf, 'If they do not agree with 'the Queen, who can neither delay the meeting of the 'Parliament, nor ſpeak to the Houſes till we hear from 'you, is to be a *Refugee*; and ſays, if I am, I promiſe 'my ſelf beforehand, to behave my ſelf better in *France*, 'than the *French* Refugees do here: make the *French* 'aſham'd

'asham'd of their sneaky *Chicane*; by Heaven they treat 'like Pedlars, or which is worse, like Attornies.' An excellent Compliment to that great Body of Men! In a word, he complains much after the same manner, as a Sinner does of the Devil, after he has been all his Life-long doing his Drudgery. But tho they treat the Enemy after this submissive manner, yet they treat their own Allies with the greatest Insolence; and Mr. *St. John* says
P. 30. of the *Dutch*, 'That they kick and flounce like wild 'Beasts caught in a Toil, yet the Cords are too strong for 'them to break; they will soon tire with struggling, and 'when they are tir'd, grow tame.'

The Treaty of Commerce the Ministry made with *Spain*, was, if possible, more infamous than that with *France*; for it allows the Subjects of *Spain* a Right to fish
P. 43. at *Newfoundland*, tho contrary to a former Treaty in 1670. and contrary to the Opinion of their own Board of Trade, and even to an Act of Parliament in the 10 & 11 of *W.* 3. which excludes all but the *English* from fishing there, or in any of the adjacent Islands; and accordingly the Commodores of our Convoys had constant Instructions to hinder all Foreigners: and consequently the agreeing to give the Dominion of *Cape Breton* to the *French*, whereby the *English* themselves are excluded from fishing there, and allowing them and the *Spaniards* a Right to fish at *Newfoundland*, is as much Treason, as depriving the Crown of any other Place or Right annex'd to it by Act of Parliament. And this is the more criminal in them, since they them-
P. 37. selves own the Business of the Fishery, which they give up, is the most essential Article in the Treaty.

By the three explanatory Articles, as they are call'd, our Merchants are to pay no less than 29 *l. per cent.* tho in the time of *Charles* II. of *Spain*, less than 10 *l. per cent.* was paid. And tho these Articles were never consented to, much less sign'd by the Queen's Plenipo's, yet they are inserted in the Ratification of this Treaty. By what Management they were ratify'd, and how legal and warrantable it was to affix the Great Seal to Articles so pernicious, the Committee say, they must submit to the Consideration of the House.

There's not one Letter, relating to this whole Affair, in the Secretary's Office; the most that appears, is, that one *Gillingham*, an *Irish* Papist, was sent to *Spain* to transact this

this matter, and that he correſponded with the Lord Treaſurer; who thinks he is ſafe, becauſe none of theſe, or any other of his Letters appear, except one to the Queen; in which he brags, 'That during the whole Ne- P. 57
'gotiation, he was oblig'd, by his own Hand, at his own 'Charge, to correſpond in all the Courts concern'd in the 'Negotiation.' But deſtroying Papers ought no more to ſkreen a Miniſter than a Bankrupt; who if he conceals any Paper relating to his Debts, is by ſo doing preſum'd to break fraudulently: which by the 4th of *Anne*, *c.* 17. is Felony without Benefit of the Clergy.

The Nation is not at preſent very ſenſible of the fatal Miſchief of loſing our Trade to *Spain* and the *Spaniſh Weſt-Indies*, becauſe the *French* not having, on the Peace, Manufactures of their own to ſupply the *Spaniſh Weſt-Indies*, bought conſiderable Quantities of us; but by the forbidding the killing of Lambs, and other Methods that ſubtle Prince takes, of encouraging their Woollen Manufactures, they will in time have ſufficient of their own, to ſupply not only the *Spaniſh Weſt-Indies*, but the *Brazils* too, to which *Portugal* is forc'd to conſent they ſhall have a direct Trade: And then to what a low and poor Condition ſhall we be reduc'd?

If the *French* had not deſpis'd our Miniſters to the laſt degree, notwithſtanding the high Courtſhip they paid them, and knew they wou'd bear any Treatment; they wou'd never have preſum'd to have attack'd our *American* Plantations after the Suſpenſion was ſign'd.

This, ſays Lord *Bolingbroke* to *Prior*, 'Is a very unto- P. 36.
'ward *Contre temps*, it gives a Theme to the Whigs, and 'ſerves to awaken Paſſions. —— We never imagin'd our 'Colonies wou'd have been attack'd, when we were knit-'ting the Bands of Friendſhip with all poſſible Induſtry:' and I ſuppoſe, it was to hinder the Breaking of theſe Bands on our ſide, that we were content to ſit down without any Satisfaction. To ſhew how ungenerouſly the *French* dealt with our Miniſtry, his Lordſhip reckons up a few of thoſe many things they had done for the *French*; as the Ceſſation, 'Which, *he ſays*, he believes in his Con-'ſcience, ſav'd their Army from being beat; and the not 'executing Deſigns, which would have annoy'd both *French* 'and *Spaniards* more, perhaps, than any thing in the 'Courſe of the War.'

And

And in another Letter to *Prior*, he gives another Inſtance of his good Diſpoſition to ſerve *France*: 'I have, *ſays he*, 'compounded the Affair of the *Griffin*; and tho the Ship 'was plainly Prize, and the Paſs might have been prov'd 'to have been deliver'd four days after ſhe was taken, 'yet *Gaultier* was ready to ſwear (and who could expect 'any other from a Popiſh Prieſt?) he receiv'd it ſome 'Months before.' Which ſhews, that ſome Months before the Suſpenſion, the *French* were protected in their Trade by Paſſes from hence: And before the general Suſpenſion by
P. 28. Sea and Land was ſign'd on the 19th of *Auguſt*, he ſays, in a Letter to *Torcy*, of *July* 18. *O. S.* 'Poſitive Orders 'are ſent to let the *French* Ships coming from the *Levant*, 'to paſs freely; the Queen embracing, with a great deal 'of Satisfaction, every Opportunity to do the King a 'Pleaſure.' In a word, the whole Conduct of theſe wretched Politicians, puts one in mind of what Lord *Bolingbroke* writes
P. 47. to *Prior*; 'For God's ſake, dear *Mat.* hide the Nakedneſs 'of thy Country, and give the beſt Turn thy fertile Brain 'can furniſh thee with, to the Blunders of thy Countrymen.'

But no fertile Brain can hide or excuſe things worſe than Blunders, which were committed with relation to the Confederate Army in *Flanders*, and to the *Catalans*: Our Conduct in theſe two Inſtances, as it was never match'd in any former Age, ſo I hope, that hereafter there never will be Men vile enough to imitate it.

The Method the Miniſtry took to bring our Allies into the Field, and in ſight of the Enemy, and when it was too late to retreat, leave them to be cut off by the Enemy; is ſhewn by the Committee to have been after this manner. The Duke of *Ormonde*, (the propereſt Perſon to execute this Deſign) to gain Confidence with the Allies, is, by his
P. 18. Inſtructions ſign'd by the Queen, *April* 12. 1712. 'to give 'the Penſionary Aſſurances of the Queen's Reſolution, of 'preſſing the War with all poſſible Vigour; and that he 'is prepar'd to live in a perfect Correſpondence with all 'the Generals, but particularly thoſe of the *State*, and 'to inform himſelf what Plan has been agreed on for the 'Operation of the Campaign: and then to go to the Army 'and concert with Prince *Eugene* and the other Generals 'proper Meaſures for entring into Action.' Theſe Orders he punctually obey'd, and the Aſſurances which he

gave

gave the *Dutch*, were receiv'd by them with the utmoſt Expreſſions of Duty. But almoſt as ſoon as he got to the Army, on *May* 10. he had a Letter from Mr. *St. John*, P. 19. *not to engage in any Siege, or hazard a Battle.* And this Order was before King *Philip*'s mind, as to the Renunciation, was known.

But tho the Inſtructions ſign'd by the Queen, ought to have been the Rule of the Duke's Actions, till countermanded, or revok'd by an equal Authority; which a Letter ſign'd only by the Secretary cou'd not be ſaid to be, eſpecially, when in his Inſtructions there was no general Direction to receive Orders from him, but only to correſpond with him; yet this does not hinder his Grace from promiſing in his Letter an exact Obedience to his Orders, and to keep them ſecret and unſuſpected. And to ſhew he was as good at tricking as the Secretary himſelf, he, the better to deceive the People at home, at the ſame time writes him another Letter, of the readineſs of his Troops to engage the Enemy: and ſays, *If we find* P. 19. *an Opportunity to bring him to Battle, we ſhall not decline it.* And his Grace not only keeps a private Correſpondence with *Villars*, the Enemies General, but turns Spy for him, and informs him of the Deſigns of the Confederates: and that *Villars* may be in no manner of pain, he tells him, 'The Motion we are going to make is principally for the 'Subſiſtence of our Troops, ſo you need not be under 'any Apprehenſion at this March; at leaſt, I can anſwer 'for the Queen's Army, which I have the Honour to com-'mand.' The Committee ſay, 'They are at a loſs to 'account for this Tranſaction, unleſs his Grace had Or-'ders not only not to act againſt *France*, but to give 'the *French* General Intelligence of all that was deſign'd 'in the Confederate Army.'

Mr. *St. John* declares in his Letter to the Duke, *June* 7. *O. S.* 'That the Queen inſiſts on the Execution of the Ar- P. 20. 'ticle relating to *Spain*, (*viz.* that it ſhou'd be ratify'd in 'the moſt ſolemn manner by the States) and on the De-'livery of *Dunkirk*, as Points without which ſhe wou'd 'not declare for a Ceſſation of Arms; ſo that if theſe 'Conditions were not abſolutely conſented to, if the An-'ſwer from *France* was not ſign'd by Monſieur *Torcy*, and '*Dunkirk* was not put into our Poſſeſſion, his Grace was 'at intire liberty to act againſt *France*; but if theſe Con-

'ditions

'ditions were comply'd with, he was immediately to de-
'clare a Ceſſation of Arms.'

The Committee very juſtly obſerve, 'That this Order,
'tho conditional, is of an extraordinary Nature, and the
'Miniſtry ſeem in very great haſte to give up all to
'*France*; when the Queen's General, at the head of a
'Confederate Army, at that time covering a Siege, in
'which the Allies were engag'd, ſhou'd be order'd to go-
'vern himſelf by ſuch Orders as he ſhou'd receive from
'*France*, and thoſe too tranſmitted by the General of the
'Enemies Army, whoſe Duty it was, by Force or Strata-
'gem, to raiſe the Siege, or gain any other Advantage
'over the Allies.'

Here it can't be deny'd, if theſe Conditions were not obſerv'd, that his general Inſtructions to preſs on the War with Vigour, in concert with the Allies, were in full force. But the Conditions were ſo far from being comply'd with, that the Renunciation was not to be ratify'd by the States of *France*; and inſtead of delivering up *Dunkirk*, a new demand was inſiſted on, That the *French* Officers ſhou'd have liberty to ſtay in the Town, and exerciſe their ſeveral Offices. The
P. 21. Memorial and Anſwer which expreſs this, and were ſent by *Villars* to the Duke, were not ſign'd by *Torcy*. This the Duke owns in his Anſwer to *Villars*; wherein he ſays, 'It were to be wiſh'd that Monſieur *Torcy* had given 'himſelf the trouble to ſign them, as being more agreea-'ble to his Inſtructions.' And in a Letter to Mr. *St. John*, *June* 29. he ſays, 'It appears now ſo evidently that *Dun-'kirk* will not be ſurrendred to him, that I ſhou'd look on 'my ſelf at liberty to act in Conjunction with the Allies.' An honeſt and brave Man, who had reſented the mean part he had been oblig'd to act, wou'd now have exerted himſelf in an extraordinary manner againſt the *French*; but inſtead of that, he aſſures the *French* General, 'that he 'will go immediately to Prince *Eugene* and the States-'Deputies, to perſuade them to abandon the Siege of *Quef-'noy*; and declare, that in caſe of a Refuſal, he ſhall be 'oblig'd to withdraw the Queen's Army.'

While things ſtood in this condition, *Villars* deſires him to ſend him word, 'What Troops, and what Generals
P. 23. 'will obey your Orders, becauſe the King gives me liberty 'to fight: I think the Work is finiſh'd, if the Army un-'der your Orders obey them.' And according to his deſire

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(for nothing is ſo civil as the Duke to the Enemy). He anſwers his Letter the ſame day, and ſays, 'I ſhould be 'glad I were at preſent in a Capacity to give you all the 'Inſight you deſire.' And then makes Apologies to the Enemies General (a thing never heard of before) for obeying his Queen's Orders; letting him know, that the Suſpenſion of Arms, tho he could not declare it in Form, had already its Effect on his ſide. And the next Morning he acquaints him, 'That Prince *Eugene* was march'd with 'all the foreign Troops, but thoſe of *Holſtein* and *Waldeck*.' And adds, 'I thought my ſelf oblig'd to acquaint you 'with it as ſoon as poſſible.' And then again ſays, 'That 'the Suſpenſion of Arms has already its effect on my 'part, by the Separation here made of the Queen's Troops, 'and all her Artillery from thoſe of Prince *Eugene*, and 'my declaring to him, I cou'd give him no Aſſiſtance; 'and that the Payment of the foreign Troops is ſtopp'd, 'and by conſequence a Burden fallen on the Emperor and '*Holland* they will not be able long to ſupport. I truſt, 'Sir, to your good Faith.' Upon this, *Villars* tells him, (and indeed he cou'd do no leſs) 'I already reckon you 'for our Ally, you are at your own liberty to come near 'us, and encamp on the King's Territories.' And the next Day the Ceſſation of Arms was proclaim'd by the Duke.

Had the Foreigners in the Queen's Pay, as it was undertaken for by *England*, and depended upon by *France*, ſeparated from the reſt of the Allies, it is notorious, that from that inſtant Prince *Eugene*'s whole Army had been at the Mercy of the *French*, either to have been cut in pieces, or made Priſoners; which muſt have left the Queen's Troops in no better Condition, than to have the Privilege of being laſt deſtroy'd: And yet, for thus diſappointing the Meaſures of *France*, tho it ſav'd the *Engliſh* as well as the reſt of the Allies, are theſe Men, who acted according to the Principles of Honour and Conſcience, puniſh'd with the Loſs of all their Pay and Subſidies. None ſure who knows any thing of the Conduct of *France* for theſe laſt fifty Years, can believe ſhe wou'd have ſlip'd an Opportunity that muſt have made her Miſtreſs of all at once. We need not go further for a Proof, than to ſee how *France* acted with relation to the *Catalans*; for whoſe Liberties the *French* King engag'd to interpoſe in the moſt effectual P. 49.

manner, and yet in the moſt effectual manner aſſiſted his Grandſon to ſubdue or deſtroy them.

None can be againſt bringing the principal Actors to condign Puniſhment, except ſuch as are ſorry that *France* miſs'd the Opportunity of deſtroying the *Engliſh* as well as Confederate Army: and ſuch Men, had they liv'd at the Time of the Gun-Powder Plot, wou'd have been as ſorry that well-laid Deſign miſcarry'd. Our Ruin certainly was as near; and if theſe Men eſcape, who thus betray'd our Allies, what Security can they have that they ſhall not be deſerted again in the very Article of Action? And yet 'tis certain, the Conduct of the late Miniſtry have made a ſtrict Confederacy more neceſſary than ever.

Had the Duke of *Ormonde* only acted according to the Direction of the Secretaries, tho that could be of no force when contrary to the ſuperior Orders ſign'd by the Queen her ſelf, there might be ſomething ſaid in his Excuſe; but there can no Apology be made for his acting directly for the Intereſt of *France*, when he had no Orders; and to play ſo mean a part as to turn Spy, and betray all the Secrets of the Allies to the Enemy; when he could not but be ſenſible, that in every ſtep he took he forfeited his Head, for *aiding*, *abetting*, and *comforting the Enemy*.

Some, to ſerve the Duke in this preſent Juncture, ſay, that he meant well, but that his Good-Nature made him eaſily impos'd on: but what they call Good-Nature, ought leſs to excuſe a General that acts this mean and treacherous part, than Cowardice does a Captain of a Fire-Ship. And Lord *Strafford*, who muſt be allow'd a good Judg in this caſe, cuts off all Pretence even to this weak Defence, in ſaying; that, 'his Grace is hearty in every P. 27. 'thing, but is really under Difficulties with thoſe about 'him; thoſe that are able are not intirely to be rely'd on, 'and thoſe that might be truſted, are not capable of gi-'ving Advice.' And conſequently, he acted contrary to the Senſe of all but a few, who were not capable of giving Advice: and this Juſtice muſt be done to the Army to acknowledg, they were all, except a few *Cowards* and *Scoundrels*, ſo hearty for the Proteſtant Religion and Succeſſion, and the Common Cauſe of *Europe*, that it was not in the Power of the late Miniſtry, nor their General, to debauch them.

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The Duke's whole Conduct abroad (not to ſay any thing of his Behaviour ſince at home) ſhows, that there is no room left to excuſe or alleviate his Crimes; nothing can be meaner or more inconſiſtent with the Character of a Man of Honour, than his Meſſage to Prince *Eugene* (after he had declar'd the Ceſſation of Arms) *viz.* 'That it was his marching without Concert with us, and P. 24. 'the Queen's Auxiliaries marching from us, expos'd us 'ſo that we were oblig'd to ſend to the *French* to de- 'clare with us a Ceſſation of Arms; and that nothing leſs 'cou'd have put the Queen's Troops in Safety.' And what makes the thing worſe is, that he was prevail'd on to do this by Lord *Strafford*.

What can ſhew a greater Attachment to *France*, than his adviſing (upon Intelligence) that the *Dutch*, who had ſurpriz'd *Fort-Knocque*, had the ſame Deſign on *Newport* or *Furnes*, and diſcovering of this to Marſhal *Villars*, who, he ſays, 'May think we owe him this good Office, P. 25. 'in requital of ſome Informations he has given me'? And his ſeizing of *Ghent* and *Bruges*, without any Order from hence, at the Requeſt of *Torcy*, and by the Advice of *Strafford*, ſhews how zealous he was for the *French* Intereſt. And ſhall we more regard this Man than the publick Safety? Do not the inſolent and treaſonable Methods taken to intimidate the Government, make it neceſſary that Juſtice ſhould be done on one, for whom his beſt Friends ſeem to be no otherwiſe able to offer the leaſt Excuſe, but by ſuppoſing him weak and worthleſs? And I believe there was ſcarce a common Trooper in the Army but was a Man of more Honour, than to have done even thoſe things which are mention'd for his Grace's Vindication in *the Conduct of the Duke of* Ormonde, *&c.*

'Tis not eaſy to determine, who rejoic'd more at this piece of Treachery, the *French* or *Engliſh* Miniſtry. Upon the unfortunate Action at *Denain*, the Conſequence of the fatal Separation, Monſieur *Torcy* ſends a Letter to Mr. *St. John*, wherein he compliments him upon this *agreeable News*, and ſays, 'The King of *France* is perſuaded that the P. 27. 'Advantage his Troops have obtain'd, will give the Queen 'ſo much the more *Pleaſure*, as it may be a new Motive 'to overcome the Obſtinacy of the Enemies to Peace. 'He hopes the Queen will effectually bring them to Rea-

'ſon, in agreeing immediately with the King, that the 'laſt Meaſures are to be taken for finiſhing this Work. 'She has the Means in her own Hands, if ſhe will make 'uſe of *Ghent* and *Bruges*; for it depends upon whom-'ſoever is Maſter of *Ghent*, to make all the Deſigns of the 'Enemy's General to miſcarry, and to give Law to the '*Dutch*.' Had he not been aſſur'd *by the Miniſtry*, that the Queen's Heart was *entirely French*, he would not have had the Impudence to write after that rate of her Majeſty. Lord *Bolingbroke*, who does not come behind *Tarcy* in rejoycing at any thing that does *France* a Pleaſure, or the Allies a Diſpleaſure, ſays, 'The Method his
P. 27. 'Grace had purſued was ſo well adapted to the preſent Con-'juncture of Affairs, that they anſwer in every Point what 'they would have wiſh'd. The News of *Dunkirk* could 'not have been follow'd by any more agreeable; the taking 'Poſſeſſion of *Ghent* and *Bruges* has improv'd her Ma-'jeſty's Views, and doubts not but that it will have a 'good Effect on the Conduct of the Allies.' And Lord *Strafford* is ſtrangely tranſported at this *Coup de Party*, as he terms it. And Lord *Oxford* compliments the Duke of *Ormond* on the *Coup de Maitre*, as he calls it.

Letter in the D. of Ormond's Conduct.

Now that the diſtreſſing one of our principal Allies ſhould cauſe ſo great a Joy in our Miniſtry, can upon no other foot be accounted for, but that they thought by this means they ſhould force the *Dutch* to accept ſo weak a Barrier as wou'd not cover them againſt *France*, if ever they ſhould attempt to act as Guarantees, in ſupport of the Proteſtant Succeſſion.

While we were thus acting as the Tools of *France*, the
P. 30. Biſhop of *Briſtol* gives an Account in ſeveral Letters, of the inexpreſſible Conſternation all the Allies were in, *that they repreſented our Proceeding as the unavoidable Ruin of* Europe; *that Religion, Liberty, and the Faith of Treaties were urged to ſhew the Enormity of our Uſage.* But they were weak Men indeed, to think by ſuch Arguments to work on our Miniſtry; when the Chief of them cou'd declare that a ſeparate Peace, which he was then puſhing on with all his force, was *knaviſh, villanous*, and *treacherous*: and another, that *Honour* and *Conſcience* were words of Courſe in a Treaty.

The Conduct of the Miniſtry in relation to the *Catalans*, will make it appear that they all thought ſo: the Queen

Queen in 1704, assures them first by Mr. *Crowe*, 'that if P. 45.
'they will throw off the *French* Yoke and come into the
'War, they shall not only be effectually supported, but
'that she would do her utmost Endeavours to procure
'for them the Establishment of all such Rights and Im-
'munities as they formerly enjoy'd under the House of
'*Austria*.' After this the Earl of *Peterborough* and Sir *Cloudesley Shovel*, were impower'd to give them the same Assurances.

Upon these repeated promises the *Catalans* are prevail'd on to throw off the *French* Yoke; they depend upon our Protection, they look upon the Assurances of the Queen of *Great Britain* as Securities strong and inviolable. They are become our Allies, and during a long War that abounded with various and extraordinary Turns, no Zeal, no Fidelity to the Common Cause was ever wanting; they had the Applauses of the Allies, and repeated Assurances by every General and Minister sent from *Great Britain*, that they shou'd never be abandon'd.

Pursuant to this, when after many glorious Victories, the Queen thought fit to enter into separate Measures of Peace, Lord *Lexington* was sent Embassador to *Spain*; at which time, considering the Circumstances of King *Philip*'s Affairs, and the Obligations he had then receiv'd from the Queen, the *Catalan* Privileges, if insisted on, could not have been refus'd.

But his Lordship's Instructions, instead of directing him to insist on this as a Condition of coming into the Peace, P. 45.
order'd him only to represent, that 'tis for the Honour of the King, as well as the Queen, that a General Amnesty be granted to the *Catalans*, with regard to their Persons, Estates, Dignities and Privileges; which words, contrary to his Instructions, he omitted. The King answers, he would make use of his Clemency when a General Peace was treated, provided the Queen would take care of his Subjects, who had suffer'd in *Flanders* and *Italy*: And tho this was a flat Refusal, he sends word to *England*, he had finish'd the Negotiation, and did not doubt, to the Queen's Satisfaction.

Two or three more successive Memorials are sent, wherein the Queen declares and repeats it often, that her *Conscience* and her *Honour* were concern'd in *this Matter*; and tho she desir'd a Peace, she must act inconsistently with both,

both, if the Privileges of the *Catalans* were not granted.

Soon after this, the King of *Spain* is acknowledg'd by our Court, and the Peace ſign'd; in which the only Article in their Favour is, that they ſhall have the ſame Privileges which the Kings beſt belov'd Subjects the *Caſtilians* enjoy'd, who had no Privileges at all, but were wholly ſubject to the Will and Pleaſure of the Prince. Thus our Miniſtry were not only content to betray, but derided them.

After this another Memorial is given in by Lord *Lexington*, wherein he ſays, 'The Queen has nothing more at
P. 48. 'heart, than to obtain for thoſe People the Privileges they 'formerly enjoy'd. This ſhe thinks ſhe is oblig'd to do 'by the two ſtrongeſt Motives poſſible, *Honour* and *Conſcience*; and hopes the King will not leave her with the 'Grief of having occaſion'd the Loſs of the Privileges of 'that People, and that he will grant this Favour to the 'Queen, which ſhe has ſo much at heart.' Who could imagine that our Ambaſſador ſhould have ſo little regard to his Miſtreſs's Honour, after giving in ſuch a Memorial, as to act a Part ſo inconſiſtent with it, and to endeavour after a moſt treacherous manner, to make the *Catalans* ſubmit at Diſcretion? But ſo it was, Lord *Lexington* writes a Letter, at the deſire of the King of *Spain*, and approv'd by him, to the Regency of *Barcelona*, *adviſing them to ſubmit to their King, that he had done all he could*; and blaſphemouſly added, *That God would not permit him to do more*: 'That if they would take their Reſolution ſoon, 'before he was out of *Spain*, he would write for them in 'the manner they ſhould deſire;' and concludes his Let-
Ibid. ter with new Aſſurances of his Concern for their Intereſt, and then gets this Letter privately convey'd into the Town by a Deſerter, as if the King of *Spain* had known nothing of it. This Treachery might juſtly be expected
P. 47. from a Man, that treated the *Catalans* as Rebels, and put the *Spaniards* in mind, that it was neceſſary they ſhould withdraw their Troops from *Andaluſia*, in order to end the *Rebellion* of the *Catalans*.

This was the more treacherous, becauſe the Queen was under an Obligation, as ſtrong as any yet mention'd, to protect the *Catalans*, *viz.* the Evacuation-Treaty with the Emperor; wherein ſhe engages her ſelf to procure the *Catalan* Liberties in the moſt effectual manner: and by this means the Emperor was prevail'd on to withdraw

withdraw his Troops, relying upon her Royal Ingagement for their Preſervation.

The King of *Spain* is ſo far from having any regard to this preſſing Memorial, that he, at this very time, propoſes to Lord *Lexington*, *That the Queen ſhould aſſiſt them with Ships to block up* Barcelona. To which he anſwers coldly, that her Majeſty would be loth to exterminate a People, who had taken up Arms at her Inſtigation, and ſo makes ſome Difficulties of it. This ſurely was treating us like a conquer'd People, as if we, not they, had been beaten ten years together, and the Victor had impos'd this hard Law, which our Neceſſities only had oblig'd us to ſubmit to; but no Circumſtances could have excus'd us, for betraying and being aſſiſtant in cutting the Throats of our moſt faithful Allies. P. 48.

Yet even thus it was, and Sir *Patrick Lawleſs*, who had been a Miniſter of the Pretender in *Spain*, and was then Outlaw'd for Treaſon, has a Character in *England*, and preſents a Memorial, wherein he deſires that the Queen would ſend a Squadron of Ships to reduce the *Catalans* to the King's Obedience.

A Fleet is accordingly fitted out, under the Command of Sir *James Wiſhart*, with Inſtructions to appear before *Barcelona*, in order to diſtreſs the Inhabitants then beſieg'd, and to attack the *Majorcans* (whom we were equally oblig'd to protect) if they refus'd to ſubmit. He arrives in the *Mediterranean*, and treats the *Barcelonians*, not as Friends and Allies, but as Rebels and Pyrates; and orders them immediately to ſubmit to *their* King of *Spain*, and demands Satisfaction for plundering ſome of the Queen's Ships.

To which they honeſtly, and in the Grief of their Hearts, anſwer, 'That but one Veſſel was taken by them 'into *Barcelona* laden with Salt, for which they paid the 'Price: That being beſieg'd, they thought they might do 'ſo with Juſtice, and by the Laws of Nations: That 'they had publiſh'd an Order, forbidding, upon pain of 'Death, any of their Ships to moleſt the *Engliſh*; no, 'tho they were carrying of Proviſions to the Enemy. What ſtronger Marks, what more convincing Proofs could they give of their Reſolutions to live in Amity with us? P. 51.

Soon after this they ſent to our Admiral a moſt melancholy and moving Account of their Condition, wherein they

P. 51. they tell him, ‘ in what manner they were encourag'd by
‘ *England* to take up Arms: That they had now been
‘ oppreſs'd both by Sea and Land for a whole Year toge-
‘ ther, during which time the Enemies had thrown Four-
‘ teen Thouſand Bombs into the Town: That they muſt
‘ inevitably fall the Victims of that Cruelty which threa-
‘ ten'd them: That they had no Comfort left to fly to,
‘ but the Queen of *Great Britain* for Protection: That
‘ they ſee no other Remedy in Nature for their Misfor-
‘ tunes, and beg him to mediate with the *French* Troops,
‘ who oppreſs them, for a Suſpenſion of Arms: That if
‘ *Catalonia* has merited any thing by its Services, this is
‘ the time to receive the Fruits of them: And that 'tis
‘ worthy his Excellency's Goodneſs to comfort the Afflic-
‘ ted, and that they hop'd he would not deny them this
‘ Favour in their great Neceſſity.' But theſe melting words did not at all affect our Admiral; for immediately he ſends ſome Ships to convoy the *Spaniſh* Flota, that the King of *Spain*'s Ships before *Barcelona* might not be with-drawn. And that the Admiral did not bombard *Barcelona*, and attack the *Majorcans*, ſeems to be wholly owing
P. 49. to the Addreſs of the Houſe of Lords to the Queen, to interpoſe in the moſt preſſing manner, that the *Catalans* might have their antient Privileges continu'd.

Thus were theſe unhappy People at once abandon'd to their Enemies, contrary to Faith and Conſcience, contrary to the moſt repeated and ſolemn Aſſurances. However, they were not wanting in their Defence; They appeal to Heaven againſt our perfidious Cruelty, and hanging up at
P. 51. the High Altar the Queen's moſt ſolemn Declaration to protect them, they underwent the utmoſt Miſeries of the Siege; Multitudes periſh'd by Famine, Multitudes by the Sword, they were all the Victims to arbitrary Power; ſome of them were executed as Rebels, others diſpers'd in ſeveral Countries in Dungeons; ſome ſent to the *Indian* Mines, never again to behold the chearful Light: In one word, theſe brave People were wholly exterminated by a mercileſs Enemy; and all this was the Work of the late Miniſtry. And will any one, after this moſt tragical Story, queſtion, whether thoſe People deſerve Death, who were the chief Agents in this *Maſſacre?* Surely it is a Debt to our ſelves, to wipe off, as far as poſſible, the Imputation of this Blood from us; which may too juſtly be laid

laid to our Charge, if we refuſe or neglect to do Juſtice to theſe ruin'd People. Let us then publickly diſavow this barbarous Treachery, that we may not grow infamous for Breach of Publick Faith, and be the Scorn of the Nations round us, even of thoſe very Men who gain'd by our Treachery. With what Eyes *France* looks upon this Action, may be gather'd from the *French* King's ſtrenuouſly inſiſting, at this very time, for the Reſtitution of his Allies, and particularly, of the Elector of *Bavaria*, whom, he ſays, he is in Honour engag'd not to deſert, and ſtipulates accordingly for him: How does this upbraid us for our cruel Perfidiouſneſs? *England* only, it ſeems, was wicked enough to betray all that truſted her?

If Conſcience and Honour will not oblige us to make Examples of theſe Monſters of Perfidiouſneſs, yet ſure the Conſideration of our own Safety muſt force us to it; without it, what Nation will enter into any Engagements with us, much leſs join their Arms with ours? Will they not be afraid, tho they ſhould act as bravely and faithfully for the Common Cauſe as the *Catalans* did, that like them they ſhall be betray'd, and like them be deliver'd up by us to the mercileſs Enemy?

There can be but two Reaſons, beſides Bribery, for our Miniſtry's acting thus in the Affair of the *Catalans*.

Firſt, Becauſe they exerted themſelves more than any other People in the Cauſe of Liberty: And 'tis not ſtrange if they, who were about inſlaving their own Country, ſhould be angry at ſuch a Precedent; and that Mr. *St. John* ſhould call them, who declar'd they would rather die than be Slaves, a *turbulent People, and that it was not for the Intereſt of* England *to preſerve their Liberties.* P. 49. P. 47.

Secondly, Becauſe upon the reducing the *Catalans*, the *French* would be more at liberty to aſſiſt the Miniſtry, in impoſing the Pretender on the Nation; ſince it was with this View they did all they could to aggrandize *France*, weaken us at Home, and depreſs the Allies Abroad.

The acting in favour of the Pretender, or holding Correſpondence with him, being direct Treaſon; 'tis no wonder if they, who deſtroy'd Papers of leſs Importance, ſhould be very careful of concealing every thing relating to him; and yet the Committee have very induſtriouſly thrown together the ſeveral Circumſtances which relate to *Gaultier*'s Tranſactions: which muſt fully evidence to the Mind of every

every impartial Reader (what the foreign Miniſters per-
P. 52. ceiv'd and declar'd to the Biſhop of *Briſtol*) that there was a Deſign to bring in the Pretender.

The References in this Affair are always to *Gaultier*: and *St. John* tells *Torcy*, in his Letter, *March* 4. 171½. *That the neceſſary Diſpoſitions were made among our People at Home*; and refers himſelf to *Gaultier*, to explain *what the Queen hopes his moſt Chriſtian Majeſty will do to co-operate with her.*

It can't be forgot, as the Committee obſerves, what great ſtreſs was laid on the Removal of the Pretender out of the Dominions of *France*: This was what the Nation with great Juſtice expected, and what the Queen declar'd was taken care of, as an additional Security to the Proteſtant Religion.

His being permitted to reſide in *Lorain*, was not only a great Surprize to all the Nation, but was receiv'd with ſuch juſt Indignation, that the Parliament addreſs'd the Queen, that ſhe would inſiſt on his Removal from *Lorain*, that Reſidence being equally or more dangerous to *Great Britain*, than his Abode in *France*. Her Majeſty anſwers, *That ſhe would repeat her Inſtances for it*; which occaſions a becoming Reſentment in the Lords, that a petty Prince, ſuch as the Duke of *Lorain*, ſhould preſume to protect a Pretender to her Throne, in defiance to her Application.

And yet all this while, 'tis as true as 'tis ſurprizing, he was protected, receiv'd, and entertain'd, not only by the Approbation, but by the Direction and Appointment of the *Engliſh* Miniſtry, who are indeed all along very anxious for his Security. The Place whither he was to retire, which was *Bar* in *Lorain*, was preſcrib'd in *England*, and fix'd when *Bolingbroke* went to *France*, whoſe Inſtructions do not ſhew any thing of ſo great Importance as to require his Lordſhip's perſonal Attendance there; and he gives us an Account from thence, that the Pretender was to go to *Bar*.

P. 53. And this was not only acquieſc'd in here, but *Prior* writes to the Secretary, that the Court of *France* hopes we ſhall have Intereſt enough with the Emperor to obtain ſuch Paſſports from him, as may ſecure the Chevalier's Perſon, in his Coming to and Reſidence in *Lorain*.

He

He writes to the ſame effect to the Treaſurer, and ſays, 'The Monarch is a good deal troubled on this head, leſt 'the young Man ſhould fall into the hands of the Huſſars 'or Barbarians,' meaning the Allies. He adds, 'Monſieur 'D'Aumont has Orders to ſpeak to our Miniſtry upon it.' Which it ſeems he did with ſo good an effect, that they ſent him the Queen's Paſſport; and in a Paper ſent to *France* from the Duke of *Lorain*, 'tis aſſerted, *That the Queen of* Great Britain *has granted her Protection to the Pretender.* p. 54.

It was four Months after the Addreſſes of Parliament for removing the Pretender from *Lorain*, before any thing was done in purſuance of thoſe Addreſſes; and Lord *Bolingbroke*, tho he had written a publick Letter to *Prior*, to remonſtrate to the Miniſter of *Lorain*, 'That 'it was inconſiſtent with Amity and good Correſpon-'dence, for his Prince to entertain a Pretender to her 'Majeſty's Dominions, and protect a Perſon that diſ-'puted her Title:' Yet four days after this he falls in love at once with the Duke of *Lorain* (who perſiſted ſtill to deny all Inſtances) and writes to *Prior* in behalf of that Prince, and bids him take care of an Equivalent for the *Montſerrat*, and concludes thus: 'In a word, you are 'enough appris'd of his Wants, of his Expectations, and 'of her Majeſty's earneſt Deſire, if by any means ſhe can 'contribute to the Eaſe and to the Advantage of a Prince, 'who deſerves much better Uſage than he has on many 'Occaſions met with.'

Thus is the Duke of *Lorain* treated, even while he perſiſts to deny the repeated Inſtances of the Queen, and protecting in his Territories an attainted Perſon, who kept about him a Company of Traitors, Aſſaſſines, and other avow'd Enemies of our Conſtitution.

Torcy tells *Bolingbroke* in a Memorial relating to the Demolition of *Dunkirk*, *That there might be Conjunctures perhaps not very remote, that might make us repent the Demolition of that Fortreſs.* Theſe words are capable of no meaning but one; and if the late Invaſion from thence did not explain this fully, the Committee's Report muſt have taken away all Doubts, and ſufficiently opens the meaning of Mr. *St. John*'s Letter of *May* 24. 1712. to Monſieur *Torcy*; where he ſays, 'He hopes we ſhall ſee reviv'd in 'a few Weeks, a good Underſtanding between two Na-' Ibid. P. 52.

'tions, which may become the moſt uſeful Friends, for 'the ſame Reaſons they have been the moſt formidable 'Enemies.'

The Pretender's Declaration which he publiſh'd immediately upon the Death of the Queen, and which the Duke of *Lorain* owns to have receiv'd from the Pretender, muſt open the Eyes of every one, not wilfully blind: wherein he ſays; 'But contrary to our Expectations upon P. 55. 'the Death of the Princeſs our Siſter (of whoſe good In-'tentions towards us, we could not for ſome time paſt well 'doubt; and this was the reaſon we then ſat ſtill, expect-'ing the good Effects thereof, which were unfortunately 'prevented by her deplorable Death) we found that our 'People, inſtead of taking this favourable Opportunity of 'retrieving the Honour and true Intereſt of their Coun-'try, by doing us and themſelves Juſtice, had immediately 'proclaim'd for their King, a foreign Prince, to our Pre-'judice, contrary to the fundamental and inconteſtable 'Laws of Hereditary Right, which their pretended Acts 'of Settlement can never abrogate.'

How ſhall we account for theſe Tranſactions? The late Miniſters did not want Capacity to ſuch a degree, to work all this Wickedneſs purely from Ignorance; tho they were very weak Men, they knew much better things: there is but one Key to unlock all theſe intricate Wards, which does it effectually, which makes all their Actions, both at home and abroad, conſiſtent; and that is this very Affair of the Pretender. If he were reſtor'd, as they term'd it, and for which they only waited *till the proper Diſpoſitions were made among the People*, then their Separate Treaties, their giving up all our Trade, their betraying their Allies, the *Catalonian* Maſſacre, the Violation of their Queen's and Country's Honour; in a word, every thing they did; nay, tho (if poſſible) they had done more for the *French* King; wou'd have carry'd Weight and Merit with it.

Can any honeſt *Engliſhman*, who loves the Laws or the Religion of his Country, not lift up his Heart with Thanks to Almighty God for our Deliverance from all the Calamities which a *French* Government and the *Popiſh* Religion muſt have brought ſpeedily upon us? and ſurely, he will look with grateful Eyes on the Inſtrument of his Providence, our Glorious Deliverer, King *GEORGE*, and generouſly reſolve to maintain him with Heart and Hands

Hands againſt theſe vile Men, and all their wicked and impious Abettors.

During theſe Men's Adminiſtration, the *ſecret* and *revealed* Will was different almoſt in every thing; and the Queen's Speeches from the Throne, and Meſſages to her Parliament, were inconſiſtent with the Meaſures the Miniſtry were purſuing; and as they now ſay, purely in Obedience to her Commands. The Committee give ſeveral Inſtances of this, of which I ſhall mention ſome.

The Queen in her Speech to the Parliament *December* 7. 1711. ſays, *That notwithſtanding the Arts of thoſe who delight in War, our Allies, eſpecially the States-General, whoſe Intereſt I look on as inſeparable from my own, have by their ready Concurrence expreſs'd their Confidence in me.* Whereas the *Dutch* dreaded nothing more than opening the Conferences upon the *French* Terms, propos'd by the Queen's Miniſters. This is fully prov'd by the Committee, who likewiſe obſerve, that tho the Queen declares, *ſhe looks on the Intereſt of the States-General to be inſeparable from her own*, yet Mr. *St. John* laments, *May* 29. 1711. 'that 'Britain has gone ſo much too far in weaving her Intereſt 'into that of the Continent, that it would prove no eaſy 'Task to diſentangle them, without tearing and rending.' P. 59.

The Queen further ſays, *That the Princes and States which have been engag'd with us in this War, being by Treaties entitled to have their ſeveral Intereſts ſecur'd at a Peace, I will not only do my utmoſt to procure every one of them all reaſonable Satisfaction; but I will alſo unite with them in the ſtricteſt Engagements for continuing the Alliance, in order to render the General Peace ſecure and laſting.* And in her Meſſage of *Jan.* 17. ſhe again expreſſes *the care ſhe intended to take of all her Allies, and the ſtrict Union in which ſhe propoſes to join with them.* But that the quite contrary was practis'd, is plain throughout the whole Report. And Mr. *St. John* does not ſcruple to affirm, that 'this Negotiation was begun and carry'd on upon 'ſuppoſition, that the Queen muſt deſiſt from many Con-'ditions, which in rigor ſhe was oblig'd to procure for her 'Allies.' P. 60.

The Queen, in her Meſſage *Jan.* 1711. declares, *That her Plenipotentiaries had begun, in purſuance of their Inſtructions, to concert the moſt proper Ways of procuring a juſt Satisfaction to all in Alliance with her, according to their Treaties,*

and

and particularly with relation to Spain *and the* Indies. And ſhe had before ſaid, in Anſwer to the Lords Addreſs, *I ſhould be ſorry any one cou'd think that I wou'd not do my utmoſt to recover* Spain *from the Houſe of* Bourbon. And who would not ſuppoſe this had been done, eſpecially ſince ſhe had in ſeveral Speeches declar'd how fatal it would be to *England* not to do it; and that *the Conſequences of reſtoring* Spain *to the Houſe of* Auſtria *would not only be advantageous, but glorious for* England? But inſtead of her doing her utmoſt, nothing at all was done: nor was *Spain* ſo much as once demanded, tho but for Form's ſake, but deſign'd from the Beginning to remain in the Houſe of *Bourbon*.

In this Meſſage the Queen further adds, *The World will now ſee how groundleſs thoſe Reports are which have been ſpread abroad by Men of evil Intentions, to ſerve the worſt Deſigns, as if a Separate Peace had been treated, for which there had not been the leaſt Colour given.*

But now the World ſees that thoſe Jealouſies were juſtly grounded, and that they were Men of ill Intentions, who to ſerve the worſt Deſigns, had caus'd the Queen to make this Declaration, as the Committee obſerve, after a ſeparate Negotiation between *England* and *France* had been carry'd on by Papers ſent backward and forward, and much time ſpent therein, as is ſaid in my Lord *Strafford*'s Inſtructions, *Octob.* 1. 1711. *Prior* had been in *France* and *Meſnager* in *England*, and not the leaſt Communication to any of the Allies of theſe Tranſactions, which were depending from *April* to *September*, when the ſpecial Preliminaries between *England* and *France* were ſign'd on both parts; which were conceal'd, publickly diſown'd, and never appear'd till this Inquiry. And all this was before the Miniſters adviſ'd the Queen to impoſe ſo groſly on the Nation, as to declare in Parliament, There had not been the leaſt colour for theſe Surmiſes.

. 61.

If a Separate Peace had not been, (to uſe the words of the Prime Miniſter) *knaviſh*, *villanous*, and *treacherous*, there had been no ground to reſent ſo highly thoſe Reports that a Separate Treaty was on foot. But this Declaration of the Queen did not hinder her Miniſters from propoſing to *France*, agreeing with *France*, and ſending poſitive and repeated Orders to her Plenipotentiaries, not only to treat, but conclude a Separate Peace. On *June* 20. 1712. Mr. *St. John* acquaints Monſieur *Torcy*,

ibid.

That

'That the Queen will make no difficulty to conclude P. 62.
'a Separate Peace with *France*, leaving the Allies a
'time to ſubmit to ſuch Conditions as ſhall be agreed on
'between *England* and *France*.' And Monſieur *Torcy* in reply ſays, 'If the Queen does immediately make a Se-
'parate Peace, and keep no meaſures with her Allies, the
'*Engliſh* Troops are to enter into *Dunkirk*.' Lord *Bolingbroke* in a Letter to *Prior* ſays, 'If ſuch Overtures as theſe
'were not inſtantly accepted by the Allies, our Separate
'Peace wou'd, ſitting this Parliament, be addreſs'd for,
'made, approv'd, and the Cauſe of *France* for once become
'popular in *Great Britain*.' And one wou'd think they had made it ſo, when we find, that when the Treaty was drawing to a concluſion, and moſt of the Allies were ready to ſign, repeated Orders were ſent from hence to ſign a Separate Peace with *France*.

On the 6th of *June* 1712. the Queen ſays, *I am now come to let you know upon what Terms a General Peace may be made.*

On the ſame day, Lord *Bolingbroke* acquaints Monſieur *de Torcy*, 'That tho the King of *France* had not anſwer'd
'the Queen's Demands according to expectation, the Queen
'wou'd not defer going that Day to Parliament, and
'making all the Declarations that were neceſſary to render
'the Nation unanimouſly inclin'd to the Peace.'

The Queen ſays, *I have not omitted any thing which might procure to all our Allies what is due to them by Treaties, and what is neceſſary for their Security.*

Lord *Bolingbroke* on the very ſame Day, in his Letter to Monſieur *Torcy* ſays, 'Lord *Strafford* is going back to
'*Utrecht*, and the Inſtructions he is to carry will put
'the Queen's Plenipotentiaries in a Condition to keep no
'longer thoſe Meaſures, to which they have hitherto
'been oblig'd to ſubmit; but from henceforth they may
'openly join with thoſe of *France*, and give Law to them
'who will not ſubmit to juſt and reaſonable Conditions:' meaning, whatever *France* wou'd pleaſe to call ſo.

The Queen ſays, *Nothing has mov'd me from ſteadily purſuing, in the firſt place, the true Intereſt of my own Kingdoms.*

Lord *Bolingbroke* juſt before, on the 24th of *May*, had propos'd to Monſieur *de Torcy*, 'That the Queen being
'much more intent upon the General Peace than any par-
'ticular

'ticular Advantages, Commiſſaries ſhould be appointed to 'ſettle, after the Peace, ſuch Points relating to Trade, as 'reqnir'd a longer Diſcuſſion than the preſent Criſis wou'd 'admit.'

As to our Commerce with *France*, the Queen ſays, *June* 6. 1712. *It was in the Method of being ſettled.* But Mr. *Prior* ſays of it in *May* following, near a Twelvemonth after, 'We had like to have made an *Athanaſian* 'Buſineſs of it at *Utrecht*.' One wou'd have thought ſo Orthodox a Perſon as Mr. *Prior* wou'd have ſpar'd the Saint, tho he reflected on the Queen.

The Queen ſays, *The Trade to* Spain *and the* Weſt-Indies *may in general be ſettled, as it was in the time of the late King of* Spain, Charles *the Second.* But when the Project of the Treaty of Commerce came from *Madrid*, Lord *Bolingbroke* ſays of it, 'They had ſent a blind, 'lame, miſhapen, indigeſted Monſter, inſtead of that fair 'Offspring, which we had reaſon to expect from our 'Candour.'

The Queen, after having declar'd how deeply our Intereſt is concern'd in the Trade of *North America*, ſays, 'France conſents to deliver up the Iſland of *Newfoundland*, P. 63. 'and *Nova Scotia*.' But Cape *Breton*, which in the Queen's Inſtructions to the Duke of *Shrewsbury* is declar'd to be part of *Nova Scotia*, and was always taken to be ſo, is expreſly given up to *France*: and the *French* have all the Advantages of *Newfoundland*, by having reſerv'd to themſelves a power of Fiſhing and drying Fiſh there.

To ſhew the great Difficulties of obtaining this Peace, and to caſt a Reflection on the Whigs, the Miniſtry prevail'd on the Queen to ſay, *That the Difficulties had been increas'd by other Obſtructions, artfully contriv'd to hinder this great and good Work.* Whereas it is notorious, that the Miniſters had receiv'd but the Day before, the account that King *Philip* had conſented to make the Renunciation, upon which account only, the Queen's ſpeaking to the Parliament had been defer'd.

If the other parts of this Speech be ſtrictly examin'd, it will be found, as the Committee obſerve, that there's ſcarce a Paragraph that does not contain ſome unfair, or at leaſt equivocal Repreſentation of the State of the Negotiations. And when the Queen was adviſ'd by her Miniſters to make this Communication to Parliament, as the Terms on which

a General Peace might be made; they had no Aſſurances, as the Committee prove from Mr. *St. John* and the Biſhop of *Briſtol*'s Letters, that *France* wou'd make good what they prevail'd on the Queen to declare in ſo ſolemn and publick a manner.

After the Queen had ſo often declar'd that ſhe cou'd not in *Honour* or *Conſcience* ſuffer the *Catalans* to be depriv'd of their antient Privileges; then to cauſe her to ſet out a great Fleet, at a vaſt Charge to the Nation; with no other Deſign than to enſlave that brave People, was a moſt barbarous Uſage of their Royal Miſtreſs.

The Part they made her act with relation to the Pretender, is as unaccountable; particularly, as to the removing him out of *Lorain*, after ſhe had, as the Duke of *Lorain* owns, granted him her Safe-guard or Protection. P. 53.

Strangers began to doubt, whether we had not a new Queen as well as new Miniſtry, when they perceiv'd every thing at home and abroad manag'd in favour of *France* and the Pretender, and that none were thought fit to be employ'd that were not in their Intereſt: they knew not how to reconcile this with that noble Declaration which had been made to the Parliament, —— *All that is dear to you muſt be irrecoverably loſt, if ever the Deſigns of a Popiſh Pretender, bred up in the Principles of the moſt Arbitrary Government, ſhou'd take place.* How cou'd they think it poſſible, that a Queen who had declar'd from the Throne, —— *we have learnt by our own Experience, that no Peace with* France *will laſt longer than the firſt Opportunity of their dividing the Allies, and of attacking ſome of them with Advantage*; cou'd ſuffer her Miniſters to act ſuch a Part, as appears by this Report they did?

It wou'd be difficult for them to ſuppoſe, that a Queen who had declar'd to her People, —— *the beſt Proof we can all give of our Zeal for the Preſervation of the Church, will be to join heartily in proſecuting the War againſt an Enemy, who is certainly engag'd to extirpate our Religion, as well as reduce this Kingdom to Slavery*; wou'd ever be brought to give up to this Enemy, after ſhe had beat him for ten Years together, all thoſe Advantages which might enable him to extirpate our Religion, and reduce all *Europe*, as well as this Kingdom, to Slavery.

'Tis not only after this manner that the late Miniſtry proſtituted the Honour of the Queen and Nation; but

 when

P. 36. when the *French* King took upon him to send over the Queen's Minister as his own (a thing wholly unprecedented) and he returns without any leave from his Queen, presuming on the Credential Letter he brought her from the *French* King; this high Affront is so far from being resented, that the Queen, upon sending *Prior* back, declares, *Append.* N. 39. 'That in continuing to behave himself so as that his Conduct may be entirely agreeable to the King of *France*, 'he does no more than execute to a tittle the Orders 'she had given him, and is a proof of his Duty and Zeal 'for her Service.'

I can't but take notice, that tho the Ministry were labouring for a Peace that wou'd be as Disadvantageous to *Britain* as Advantageous to *France*; yet it appears from this very Letter that they perswade the Queen that the Part which the *French* King acted, was out of respect to her: and therefore after she has complemented him for his *consummate Wisdom*, she in very obliging Terms thanks him *for the great facility he was pleas'd to lend towards fixing the Terms of Peace, out of regard to her; and that she does all in her Power in favour of a Prince whose Interest is supported by his Generosity.*

When the *French* King, during the War, desires that his Ships may pass through the *Levant* unmolested, the Queen answers so unreasonable a Request with the highest P. 28. deference; that 'she embraces, with a great deal of Pleasure, every Opportunity that offers to do the King a 'Pleasure.'

Nay, the Ministry make the Queen apply her self in the most submissive Terms to *Philip*, who ow'd his being settled in his Throne to her Generosity, in saying, That *she hopes his Majesty will not leave her with the Grief of Heart, but grant her the Favour*, &c.

The Creatures of the late Ministry tax'd the former for not treating the Queen with a sufficient Respect; but was there during that Administration, an Instance of any, who like *Prior*, acting by the Queen's Authority, apply'd himself to the Lord Treasurer for distinct and positive Orders to release him from the Queen's Instructions, because they are thought by the Ministers of *France* to be too strict? *Prior*'s words are these: 'I only write to your 'Lordship, it being a thing that should not be canvass'd in 'Council; and I have premis'd that the King should 'have

'have her Majesty's Answer upon it as he desires. Again, P. 40.
'your Friendship does all the Business here, I shall direct
'my self, as you shall direct me privately.'

As Mr. *Prior* was too much a Courtier to write any thing to the Treasurer but what he knew was acceptable to him, so if he acted according to his desire, he was guilty of High Treason, in assuming the Regal Authority to himself.

Another thing in which they highly expos'd the Honour of the Queen was, that when the Demands of all the Princes and Potentates in Alliance with us, met not with the least regard, the Interest of a Subject of the Enemy, the Princess *Ursini* (as Errant a C——t as the L——y *M*——*m*) shou'd be espous'd in the strongest Terms. Lord *Bolingbroke*, *March* 3. 1712. tells the Plenipo's, 'that her Majesty does not much enter into the Notion of 'the Degradation of *Hannover*, as a matter of any Im- P. 41.
'portance; tho he declares that a demand of a Principa-
'lity in the *Spanish Netherlands*, and a yearly Revenue
'of 30000 Crowns for the Princess *Ursini*, must be made
'to the Emperor, and all Parties concern'd, a Condition
'*sine qua non* of the General Peace.'

These Men have as little regard to the Honour of the Parliament as of the Queen. Mr. *St. John* does not indeed in direct Terms affirm, that the House of Commons was brib'd; but he says, Mr. *Harley*, 'who is fully P. 10.
'instructed in the Queen's Views and Designs, was too
'useful to be spar'd till the House of Commons was per-
'fectly secur'd to the Queen's Interest, and to the Mea-
'sures of Peace:' And adds, 'I think I may say they are
'absolutely so now.'

The Committee say, 'They can't but take notice of the
'Reflection cast on that House of Commons, as if they
'were secur'd to the Queen's Interest and the Measures
'of Peace, by the Management of a Secretary to the
'Treasury, a near Relation, and trusty Agent to the Lord
'High Treasurer.'

And they add, 'For whose Service Mr. *Harley* had been
'so well employ'd at home, and was now to be sent a-
'broad, can't be a doubt, since Mr. *St. John* thought it
'necessary to give Monsieur *Torcy* an immediate Account
'of his successful Endeavours here, and the Business he was
'sent abroad to manage.' And after he has told him that *the necessary Dispositions are made among the People at*

home, he refers him (as he constantly does in things relating to the Pretender) to the Abbot *Gaultier* to explain to him Mr. *Harley*'s Instructions; which tho they were not thought a Subject proper to be committed to writing, yet what was meant by the necessary Dispositions made among the People at home, is pretty well explain'd in Monsieur *Torcy*'s Answer; 'Wherein he commends the 'prudent Conduct of the Court of *Great Britain* in ma- 'naging the House of Commons; and says, 'The King 'of *France* assures himself, that those who now manage 'with so much Capacity the Affairs of *Great Britain*, know 'how to curb the Passion of the turbulent Party in the 'other House.' And accordingly that turbulent Party, as the *French* King does the Patriots of our Country the Honour to call them, are curb'd by an unheard of way; in adding all at once, a number of very pliant Peers to overballance 'em; and then the *French* King's Business went on as smoothly as he could wish.

A Prime Minister would be highly Criminal, if finding the majority of the twelve Judges to be above Corruption, he added such a number to them as would outvote these unbiass'd Judges; how much more Criminal is it to act this part with relation to the House of Lords? who are both Judges and Jury, and whose Determination none can reverse but the Legislature, of which they are a Part. This would be to put the Rights, the Liberties, and Estates of the Nation in the Hands of the Ministry; and in effect, to destroy the Judicial Power of the House of Lords, as well as to render the Share they have in the Legislature insignificant, while the Ministers can never be in danger of being punish'd for thus breaking in on the Constitution; since they can increase the number of their Judges as they think fit: and if besides bribing of one House, and augmenting the other, they have got the Prince so much in their Power as to make him act as they please, and say or unsay any thing to serve their turn; what is there to restrain them from selling their Country to the highest Bidder?

No Ministry can give a better Earnest of their intending to act a fair part, and of being intirely in the Interest of their Country, than in calling their Predecessors to account for their Male-Administration; and if they are not supported as they ought to be, but the Nation are

content

content to let ſuch monſtrous Crimes go without a juſt Puniſhment, rather than exert themſelves, it ſhews they are ripe for Deſtruction, and that their Ruin can't be far off.

Of all People, thoſe who went by the name of Tories, and are not Jacobites and *Frenchmen*, ought to be the moſt zealous for puniſhing theſe Criminals; becauſe it was they, and not the Whigs, who were deceiv'd by them: it was they who, believing their Proteſtations, blindly came into their Meaſures, and thank'd them for a *ſafe, honourable*, and *advantageous Peace*, before they knew the Terms of it.

And ſure 'tis impoſſible for any, who were not in the Secret, not to bluſh, when they perceive, by reading the *Report*, how groſly they were impos'd on, and made to rail at Men as delighting in War, as Enemies to the Queen's Peace, who now appear to be guilty of no other Crime, but ſteddily purſuing the Intereſt of their Country. And if they will not join with the Jacobites and Papiſts, in promoting the Cauſe of Popery, *France*, and the Pretender, they muſt, ſince now there's no Medium, join with the Whigs, in eſpouſing the Intereſt of King *GEORGE*, and the Common Proteſtant Cauſe.

All but ſuch as are wilfully blind, muſt needs now ſee, that nothing is more ridiculous than the Clamour that's made about the Danger of the Church from the Diſſenters; ſince they, notwithſtanding their peaceable Behaviour, and the Protection of the Law, are ſo weak as not to be able to hinder their Places of Worſhip from being pull'd down by an inſolent Mob, who openly declare for the Pretender, and who are ſo far from doing any Damage to the Popiſh Maſs-Houſes, that 'tis notorious they are, in many Places, under the Influence and Management of profeſs'd Papiſts.

And here I can't but adviſe my honeſt Countrymen, if they ſee any Man warm for thoſe their Repreſentatives have thought fit to impeach, to conſider whether, by his former Conduct, they have not reaſon to conclude him to be in the Intereſt of the Pretender; or whether he may not be one of thoſe, who were apply'd to by the late Secretary to the Treaſury, the near Relation and truſty Agent of the Lord *Oxford*; or if he be a Clergyman, to examine whether he does not appear, by his Life and Converſation,

verſation, to be capable of being in the Intereſt of the Pretender, in hopes of having ſuch Popiſh Doctrines prevail, as promote the Power and Profit of the Clergy.

The late Miniſtry and their Tools, in order to ſet the Nation againſt their Allies, were continually repreſenting them, as throwing the Burden of the War on us, and gaining ſo conſiderably by it themſelves, as to be for continuing it on at any rate. But that in this, as in every thing elſe, they ſpake againſt their own Judgment, will appear out of the Report.

33. Lord *Strafford* ſays, 'The *Dutch* are mightily ſunk with
'their Misfortunes, not knowing well what Meaſures
30. 'to take; and that ſtopping the Pay of the Foreigners
'makes them humble.

23. The Duke of *Ormonde* ſays, 'That by ſtopping the Pay
'of the foreign Troops, there is fallen on the Emperor
'and *Dutch* a Burden they will not be able long to ſup-
'port.'

22. Mr. *St. John* goes further, and ſays, in a Letter to Monſieur *Torcy*, 'The Peace is in the King's Hand: if the
'Duke of *Ormonde*'s whole Army conſents to the Suſpen-
'ſion of Arms, our firſt Project ſucceeds; if they will not,
'the *Engliſh* Troops will withdraw, and leave the Fo-
'reigners to ſeek for their Subſiſtence from the States;
'*who far from being able to furniſh new Expences*, are not
'capable to ſupport what they have already on their hands.'

Before I conclude, I can't but take notice, that if ſuch a Scene of Villany appears by thoſe Papers the Perſons accus'd have thought fit to leave, what would it be if the whole were brought to light; particularly thoſe verbal Inſtructions that *Gaultier* was entruſted to communicate to Monſieur *Torcy*?

Tho the Lord of *Oxford* correſponded with all the Courts concern'd in the Negotiation during the whole time, yet we have but one Letter of his, and that is to the Queen, relating to home Tranſactions; and by that (a moſt unimitable Piece) it appears, that the Miniſtry was guilty
56. of the vileſt Management in the World. He owns, that ſome of his Fellow-Servants were very angry, that he would not let them cheat the Publick in the *South-Sea* Affair an hundred thouſand Pounds: And he ſays, To this Principle was owing the ſetting on foot the unhappy Voyage to *Canada*, and that the Publick was cheated of a-

bove

bove twenty thousand Pounds, and names Mr. Secretary *St. John* and Mr. *Moor*, and that the Lord Chancellor told him more to that purpose; that they said, No Government was worth serving, that would let them make such Advantages, and get such Jobs: so that here is an Expedition set on foot, which cost the Nation best part of a Million, besides a thousand Lives, and eight or ten Ships, to gain such honest Men twenty thousand Pounds.

Nor was the Treasurer much honester by his own Confession, since he says, 'He us'd all his Credit and Skill to keep P. 57. 'the House of Commons from examining this Affair, and 'that he prevail'd on Sir *Thomas Hanmore*, and others, up- 'on throwing out the Commerce-Bill (the best thing they ever did) 'to come into the payment of the Civil List 'Debts:' that is, to run the Nation five hundred thousand Pounds in Debt, that the Ministry might reap the Benefit of it. And tho in this Letter he rails at others for robbing the Publick, he cheated it, as is shewn in this Report, of twelve thousand Pounds at one time. It appears by this Letter, that the Quarrels among the Ministry were come to a great height, and that the Queen her self was not spar'd: and 'tis not improbable, that as before they had done all they could to ruin her Majesty's Honour abroad; so when by their Quarrels, and bitter Reproaches of each other, her self could not but see and feel how shamefully her Name and Honour were expos'd and wounded; the deep Sense of this hasten'd her down with Sorrow into *her* Grave. And whether those who have done all this Injury to their Queen, Country and Allies, deserve to go to *theirs* in Peace, I leave to your own Consideration.

Appendix No. 91. P. 57.

FINIS.

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